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ABSTRACT
We investigate the determinants of corporate sustainability
reporting decision. We use a logistic regression model to analyse
data collected from a sample of 138 firms listed on the Pakistan
Stock Exchange for the years 2009–2018. We find that firms with
more gender-diverse boards, larger audit committees and higher
institutional ownership are more likely to issue sustainability
reports. We also find that concentrated ownership, managerial
ownership, foreign ownership and audit committee
independence negatively influence the firms’ sustainability
reporting decision. The findings provide valuable insight to
Pakistani policymakers by identifying the attributes that require
regulatory focus to achieve the public policy objective of
sustainable development. We are the first to explore the
determinants of sustainability reporting decision in Pakistan. It
provides empirical evidence to regulators and policymakers in
Pakistan and other emerging markets who have already adopted
a governance framework and are considering sustainability
reporting in their respective contexts.
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Sustainability reporting is being used increasingly by businesses as a powerful mechan-
ism in corporate policy and strategy (Ong and Djajadikerta 2018). It plays an imperative
role in providing the tools required to implement the sustainable development goals,
drive the investment to sustainable business practices and finance the sustainability out-
comes that the world is looking for (Durand, Paugam, and Stolowy 2019). Sustainability
reporting covers all areas of economic efficiency, social responsibility, environmental
awareness, ethical culture and corporate governance. Governance functions cannot be
completed without sustainability as both are influenced by social, environmental, and
economic aspects (Hu and Loh 2018). Businesses around the globe are under growing
pressure from stakeholders (Hermawan and Gunardi 2019). Sustainability reporting is
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used interchangeably with integrated reporting, social reporting or environmental
reporting to reflect corporate responsibility towards their stakeholders.
Herda, Taylor, and Winterbotham (2012) report that corporate sustainability disclos-
ures reduce the information asymmetries and uncertainties between a firm and its stake-
holders. Sotorrío and Sánchez (2010) advocate that firms from industries with high social
and environmental effects voluntarily disclose sustainability information to meet the
sector-specific demands of stakeholders. Blasco and King (2017) argue that sustainability
practices differ across countries and regions owing to diverse social behaviour and state
regulations. Quite a lot of initiatives have been launched to promote corporate sustain-
ability around the globe. The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), International Integrated
Reporting Council (IIRC) and Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB)
provide guidance to businesses and governments worldwide to understand and commu-
nicate their impact on sustainability issues.
Sustainability reporting is gaining momentum as a voluntary reporting mechanism to
enhance business sustainability and relationship with investors and clients to meet the
stakeholders’ demand for transparency and accountability (Belal and Momin 2009;
Hahn and Kühnen 2013; Lourenço and Branco 2013). Evidence suggests that 93% of
the top 250 firms in the Global Fortune 500 and 75% of the top 100 firms in 49 countries
surveyed, issue sustainability reports (Blasco and King 2017). However, there is a paucity
of research on the organisational determinants of corporate sustainability reporting.
Most of the prior studies focus on the areas such as the nature and content of sustain-
ability performance based on the companies operating in developed countries (Artiach
et al. 2010; Rao and Tilt 2016) with little known about the determinants of sustainability
reporting decision. Moreover, the Covid-19 pandemic has made sustainability disclos-
ures more important than ever and investors are interested in the firms, which are focus-
ing on their employees, suppliers and the communities in which they operate (BSR 2020).
Corporate sustainability reporting is drawing attention in emerging economies. The
Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI), a global provider of stock market
indexes, reclassified Pakistan to emerging market index in June 2017 after keeping it
on frontier markets for nine years. Pakistan’s capital market has social, political, cultural
and economic attributes that provide a unique country context to investigate the drivers
of corporate sustainability reporting. Pakistan has implemented major structural reforms
to improve investment climate and to attract local, regional and foreign direct invest-
ments. The state, families and multinationals dominate the corporate landscape
(Mahmood, Kouser, and Masud 2019), while its regulatory framework is not robust
owing to ineffective enforcement and incapacity to adapt to the changing circumstances
(Mirza 2017). Moreover, with 540 listed firms, Pakistan has a handful of reporting on sus-
tainability performance. Therefore, this study aims to empirically examine the determi-
nants of corporate sustainability reporting decision from the context of an emerging
market, Pakistan.
The empirical findings suggest that the firms with more gender-diverse boards, larger
audit committees and higher institutional ownership are more likely to issue sustainability
reports. In addition, concentrated ownership, managerial ownership, foreign ownership
and audit committee independence negatively influence the firms’ sustainability reporting
decision. These findings confirm that the corporate governance structure of a firm facili-
tates addressing the social and stakeholders’ pressure through sustainability reporting.
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Using a stakeholder framework, this study makes several principal contributions and
extensions to the sustainability and disclosure literature. First, this paper extends the
findings of prior studies based on emerging economies in general and Pakistan in par-
ticular, which mainly focus on the nature and content of sustainability reporting
(Lone, Ali, and Khan 2016; Mahmood, Kouser, and Masud 2019; Masud, Nurunnabi,
and Bae 2018; Naseem et al. 2017). Second, it is one of the foremost empirical endeavours
to explore the determinants of sustainability reporting decision in Pakistan. Third, the
study provides empirical evidence to regulators and policymakers in Pakistan and
other emerging markets who have already adopted corporate governance framework
and are considering sustainability reporting in their respective contexts. Finally, it inves-
tigates a comprehensive set of corporate governance attributes embracing board compo-
sition, ownership structure and audit committee, and uses the data collected over a
relatively long and recent period.
The rest of this study is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of sus-
tainability reporting in Pakistan. Section 3 critically reviews the relevant literature and
develops the research hypotheses. Section 4 describes the research design, data, empirical
model and variables. Section 5 illustrates the interpretation, analysis and discussion of the
empirical findings. The final section presents the conclusion, including the implications
and recommendations for future research.
2. Sustainability reporting in Pakistan
The corporate sector in Pakistan has a tradition of being socially responsible due to its
philanthropic contributions and endowments (Masud, Nurunnabi, and Bae 2018).
However, only 50 out of 540 listed firms in Pakistan are reporting on sustainability
issues as a standalone report (Hongming et al. 2020). The content and methodology of
disclosures also vary across companies and sectors. These firms are upgrading labour
standards, protecting biodiversity and providing health facilities to local communities
(Mahmood, Kouser, and Masud 2019). On the other hand, all these firms are deficient
in adhering to their corporate social responsibility (CSR) with respect to anticorruption,
workforce representation, gender equality and child labour (Naseem et al. 2017). Corpor-
ate sustainability reporting is in its initial stages and developing progressively in Pakistan.
Masud, Nurunnabi, and Bae (2018) suggest that corporate social responsibility is the cor-
porate sector’s contribution to sustainable development and the firms should link CSR to
their competitive advantage.
Sustainability reporting is a matter of concern for the corporate sector in Pakistan to
compete in the international market and to attract multinational firms as European
markets increasingly reward the firms, which voluntarily report their sustainability per-
formance (Mahmood, Kouser, and Masud 2019). World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and the
Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA) started Environmental Report-
ing Awards in 2002 to encourage sustainability reporting in Pakistani firms. The Institute
of Chartered Accountants of Pakistan (ICAP) and the Institute of Cost and Management
Accountants of Pakistan (ICMAP) jointly launched Best Sustainability Report Award in
the year 2011 to recognise excellence in sustainability reporting and to create awareness
about corporate social responsibility. Cleaner Production Institute (CPI) initiated a Pro-
gramme for Industrial Sustainable Development (PISD) in collaboration with Royal
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Netherlands Embassy to facilitate industrial firms in producing corporate sustainability
reports. Some other organisations are also working to promote corporate sustainability
reporting in Pakistan, including CSR Pakistan, Asiatic Public Relations (APR), Global
Compact Pakistan, Responsible Business Initiative (RBI) and the Pakistan Centre for Phi-
lanthropy (PCP). Therefore, the practice of sustainability reporting in Pakistan is largely
driven by external forces like other emerging countries (Mahmood, Kouser, and Masud
2019), while the prevalent regulatory and structural environments have resulted in a lack
of expectations and pressures from internal stakeholders (Mirza 2017).
Owing to the increase in stakeholders’ emphasis on sustainability performance, the
regulators have realised the need to establish reporting and disclosure requirements
for promoting socially responsible behaviour among the corporate sector. Staying in
line with global best practices, the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan
(SECP) issued ‘Corporate Social Responsibility Order, 2009’ and ‘Corporate Social
Responsibility Voluntary Guidelines, 2013’ to make sustainability performance more
comparable among the firms operating in Pakistan (Lone, Ali, and Khan 2016). These
regulations require the companies to disclose their activities related to community invest-
ment, governance practices, product responsibility, work-life balance, safety measures
and climate change, as a minimum. The SECP has emphasised the role of firm boards
to formulate social responsibility policy in liaison with strategic business decisions to
shape Pakistan’s future development. An increasing number of firms are now embracing
global best practices after meeting the requirements of local legislation. These firms have
also started pursuing independent assurance of their sustainability performance.
However, corporate sustainability reporting is still a voluntary activity in Pakistan as
there is no mandatory requirement for the same and the above regulations only indirectly
emphasise the need to report CSR actions.
3. Empirical review and hypotheses
3.1. Theoretical framework
The most frequently cited theory in sustainability reporting and voluntary disclosure
studies is the stakeholder theory. Stakeholder theory provides a theoretical framework
to explore the determinants of corporate sustainability reporting (Lourenço and
Branco 2013). The stakeholders raise various social, economic and environmental
demands to achieve the strategic objectives of the firm. The mechanism through
which firms address these demands is sustainability reporting (Buallay and Al-Ajmi
2019). This study aims to analyse the factors that influence a firm’s decision to issue a
corporate sustainability report. Using a stakeholder framework, a number of hypotheses
are developed that relate the corporate governance practices of firms to their sustainabil-
ity reporting decision.
The stakeholder concept is divided into a corporate planning model and a corporate
social responsibility model (Freeman and Dmytriyev 2017). The corporate planning
model emphasises the endorsement of corporate strategic decisions by various groups
who are imperative for the continued existence of a firm and include owners, creditors,
suppliers, employees, customers (Artiach et al. 2010). This model is based on the funda-
mental proposition of stakeholder theory that the success of a firm is subject to effective
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management of dynamic and complex relationships with its stakeholders. This stream of
stakeholder concept also addresses the conflicting interests of diverse corporate stake-
holders (Saleh, Zulkifli, and Muhamad 2010). On the other hand, the corporate social
responsibility model supplements the corporate planning model to incorporate external
influences adversarial to the firm and include regulators or social interest groups
(Freeman and Dmytriyev 2017). It leads to the development of a corporate strategic
plan in conformance with corporate social responsibility.
In the context of Pakistan, the corporate planning model offers incentives, while the
corporate social responsibility model provides moral support to implement sustainable
practices. Hence, there are incentives for the Pakistani firms to invest in social and sus-
tainability activities as these investments uphold their competitiveness (Mirza 2017).
From the stakeholder perspective, investors could view the firms issuing sustainability
reports as being a superior match with their environment, and consequently, their invest-
ment risk is lower in the long-term (Mahmood, Kouser, and Masud 2019). The extant
literature indicates that stakeholder power is related to corporate sustainability perform-
ance (Buallay and Al-Ajmi 2019; Girella, Rossi, and Zambon 2019). As sustainability
reporting is still a voluntary activity in Pakistan, the stakeholder theory offers a practical
framework to investigate the determinants of sustainability reporting decision. More-
over, Pakistani firms may undertake CSR initiatives to increase their goodwill and sub-
sequently disclose the sustainability performance information to gain the support of
influential corporate stakeholders and to conduct economically viable operations.
3.2. Corporate governance attributes
Stakeholder theory provides a theoretical foundation for investigating the determinants
of corporate sustainability reporting. It advocates that corporate governance attributes
transform a stockholder centric- into stakeholder-oriented organisation. These govern-
ance practices encourage the firm’s management to consider broader ethical and social
considerations. Evidence suggests that the board of directors, audit committee and stock-
holders are the key pillars of corporate governance (Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, andWright
2004; Hemraj 2003). Therefore, the attributes that will be discussed include board com-
position, ownership structure and audit committee.
3.2.1. Board composition
Board composition plays an important role in setting the direction of a firm and balancing
the competing demands of its stakeholders (Sarhan and Ntim 2019). Alnabsha et al. (2018)
advocate that board size has a positive impact on the effectiveness of a firms’ oversight
function and the level of corporate disclosures. It strengthens the decision-making capacity
of a firm and improves the information processing capability (Alotaibi and Hussainey
2016). In the context of Pakistan, Lone, Ali, and Khan (2016) and Naseem et al. (2017)
contend that board size is positively related to the level of CSR disclosures, while
Mahmood et al. (2018) argue that it has no impact on sustainability disclosure practices.
However, evidence also suggests that board size is negatively associated with corporate sus-
tainability reporting due to coordination issues in the decision-making process (Amran,
Lee, and Devi 2014; Kiliç, Kuzey, and Uyar 2015). A larger board can take a broader per-
spective given the opinions and experiences of all stakeholders, which leads to more
JOURNAL OF SUSTAINABLE FINANCE & INVESTMENT 5
voluntary information disclosures (Frias-Aceituno, Rodriguez-Ariza, and Garcia-Sanchez
2013). In addition, a larger board is more likely to represent a diverse group of stakeholders
who encourage the firm to engage in CSR practices (Girella, Rossi, and Zambon 2019). A
larger board strengthens the relationship with the community, influences the firm to react
positively to social pressure and increases the probability of producing a sustainability
report (Coffie, Aboagye-Otchere, and Musah 2018). Therefore, based on the stakeholder
theory, the following hypothesis is proposed:
H1: Firms with larger boards have a higher likelihood of issuing a sustainability report.
Board independence is a corporate governance mechanism to safeguard the interests of
all stakeholders (Ong and Djajadikerta 2018). As independent directors are not associ-
ated with management, they can push the firms for voluntary informative disclosures
(Hu and Loh 2018; Lone, Ali, and Khan 2016). Masud, Nurunnabi, and Bae (2018)
contend that Pakistani firms with a higher fraction of independent directors are more
concerned about accountability, transparency and corporate sustainability. Empirical lit-
erature also provides some conflicting results in the Saudi Arabian and Pakistani settings
suggesting that board independence is negatively linked to CSR disclosure practices (Alo-
taibi and Hussainey 2016; Mahmood et al. 2018). Naseem et al. (2017) advocate that inde-
pendent directors facilitate in the integration of corporate social responsibility into
organisational policies, which strengthens the related disclosure practices in Pakistan.
Likewise, Khan, Muttakin, and Siddiqui (2013) report that the presence of outside inde-
pendent directors on a firm’s board has a positive impact on the extent of CSR disclos-
ures. Herda, Taylor, and Winterbotham (2012) argue that board independence positively
influences the firm’s voluntary reporting decision and increases the probability of pub-
lishing a standalone sustainability report. Considering the above discussion and stake-
holder perspective, the following hypothesis is predicted:
H2: Firms with more independent boards have a higher likelihood of issuing a sustainability
report.
The empirical literature suggests that the presence of female directors develops board
effectiveness, corporate philanthropy and sustainability reporting practices (Ong and
Djajadikerta 2018). Matuszak, Różańska, and Macuda (2019) advocate that gender-
diverse boards are more concerned about social and environmental protection,
working conditions and customer relationships. Sarhan and Ntim (2019) contend that
a gender diverse board strengthens the bond between a firm and its external environment
that helps to build the trust of all stakeholders. Khan, Khan, and Saeed (2019) and Lone,
Ali, and Khan 2016 document that board gender diversity has a positive influence on CSR
disclosures in Pakistan, while Majeed, Aziz, and Saleem (2015) find a negative association
in this respect. Moreover, women directors exhibit greater responsibility and seek more
voluntary information, which improves the decision-making process and the extent of
CSR disclosure (Rao and Tilt 2016). Frias-Aceituno, Rodriguez-Ariza, and Garcia-
Sanchez (2013) conclude that board gender diversity performs a vital role in the dissemi-
nation of integrated corporate sustainability reporting and stakeholder engagement.
Abad et al. (2017) argue that board gender diversity has a significant positive impact
on corporate sustainability reporting decision. Given this theoretical debate, the follow-
ing hypothesis is formulated:
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H3: Firms with more gender-diverse boards have a higher likelihood of issuing a sustainabil-
ity report.
The frequency of meetings represents the efforts made by board members and so is the
benchmark of board activities (Liao, Lin, and Zhang 2018). Board meeting is the core
communication channel through which directors acquire corporate information to
execute their monitoring obligation (Alotaibi and Hussainey 2016). Alnabsha et al.
(2018) provide that more frequent board meetings signal increased board vigilance,
which requires more voluntary disclosures to handle the operations effectively.
Naseem et al. (2017) argue that corporate boards in Pakistan that meet frequently are
more likely to require disclosure of CSR information to safeguard the interests of all sta-
keholders. On the other hand, prior studies advocate that boards in weak governance
regimes meet more frequently to resolve business problems rather than to execute
their corporate responsibilities (Iraya, Mwangi, and Wanjohi 2014; Johl, Kaur, and
Cooper 2015). Khan, Khan, and Saeed (2019) document that the frequency of board
meetings is not associated with sustainability disclosures in Pakistan. Shrivastava and
Addas (2014) contend that board meeting frequency predicts a firm’s environmental,
social and governance performance as these boards are more disciplined. Hu and Loh
(2018) suggest that the frequency of board meetings has a positive impact on sustainabil-
ity reporting decision as directors find time to discuss the stakeholder engagement strat-
egies and corporate sustainability practices owing to more interactions. Hence, the
following hypothesis is proposed:
H4: Firms with more frequent board meetings have a higher likelihood of issuing a sustain-
ability report.
3.2.2. Ownership structure
Masud, Nurunnabi, and Bae (2018) advocate that ownership structure influences corpor-
ate sustainability reporting in South Asian countries. Evidence suggests that the firms
with concentrated ownership are less motivated to disclose more voluntary information
because the demand for public disclosure is relatively weak (Kolsi 2017; Sartawi,
Hindawi, and Bsoul 2014). Sánchez, Sotorrío, and Díez (2011) provide that companies
are more interested in social, environmental and governance issues when the ownership
is less concentrated. Kiliç, Kuzey, and Uyar (2015) argue that the issues of public
accountability and social responsibility become less important if the ownership is con-
centrated, as these firms are not owned by the public at large. However, Iraya,
Mwangi, and Wanjohi (2014) contend that concentrated holdings have a positive
impact on corporate disclosure practices in Kenya. Coffie, Aboagye-Otchere, and
Musah (2018) and Majeed, Aziz, and Saleem (2015) indicate that ownership concen-
tration is positively associated with CSR disclosures in Ghana and Pakistan respectively.
Stakeholder theory suggests that the firms with concentrated ownership do not react
positively to social pressure, which negatively affects their corporate sustainability per-
formance (Lourenço and Branco 2013). Muttakin and Khan (2014) find that ownership
concentration is negatively associated with corporate social responsibility disclosure
practices. Mahmood, Kouser, and Masud (2019) document that concentrated ownership
has a negative influence on corporate sustainability reporting in Pakistan. Based on the
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above empirical debate and stakeholder perspective, the following hypothesis is
predicted:
H5: Firms with more ownership concentration have a lower likelihood of issuing a sustain-
ability report.
Institutional investors consider the environmental, social and governance performance
of a firm as a preferred attribute in their investment decision (Saleh, Zulkifli, and
Muhamad 2010). Unlike other shareholders, they usually take long-term positions and
are more attentive to a firm’s strategic decisions regarding its sustainability policies
and strategies (Harjoto and Jo 2011). Empirical literature contends that institutional
ownership is positively associated with the level of sustainability disclosures in Pakistan
(Masud, Nurunnabi, and Bae 2018; Majeed, Aziz, and Saleem 2015). However, some
studies find that increase in institutional ownership strengthens the association
between institutional investors and managers, which makes their effectiveness redundant
and has a detrimental impact on CSR (Kolsi 2017; Oh, Cha, and Chang 2017). Boone and
White (2015) argue that the presence of institutional investors encourages a firm to
report more voluntary information because they believe low disclosure may increase
the investment risks. Soliman, El Din, and Sakr (2013) advocate that institutional inves-
tors are concerned about corporate sustainability as it builds long-term reputation and
mitigates pressures from external activist groups. Considering these academic argu-
ments, the related hypothesis is stated as follows:
H6: Firms with more institutional ownership have a higher likelihood of issuing a sustain-
ability report.
Managerial ownership facilitates the managers to determine strategies with respect to
corporate social behaviour and as a result influences the corporate reporting practices
(Alotaibi and Hussainey 2016). González and García-Meca (2014) contend that man-
agerial ownership in Latin American markets has a positive impact on corporate dis-
closure practices if the fraction of stock owned by managers is not very high.
However, managers with a high stake in the firm do not invest in socially responsible
practices as the costs of these endeavours may outweigh the likely benefits and may
reduce the stock value (Khan, Muttakin, and Siddiqui 2013). Moreover, an increase
in managerial ownership makes them more powerful than the stakeholders, triggers
self-seeking behaviour and reluctance to engage in social initiatives (Oh, Cha, and
Chang 2017). Evidence suggests that managerial ownership is negatively linked to cor-
porate sustainability reporting as these firms have less public accountability (Faller and
zu Knyphausen-Aufseß 2018). Sarhan and Ntim (2019) argue that companies with
lower managerial ownership, invest more in CSR activities and related disclosures to
build stakeholders’ confidence. Masud, Nurunnabi, and Bae (2018) posit that as direc-
tors own more shares in South Asian countries (Pakistan, India and Bangladesh), they
become less motivated to provide corporate sustainability information because it nega-
tively affects their compensation and benefits. Based on this discussion, the following
hypothesis is proposed:
H7: Firms with more managerial ownership have a lower likelihood of issuing a sustainabil-
ity report.
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Stakeholder theory provides that foreign investors encourage management to invest in
socially responsible projects and disclose all related information to address the
demands of stakeholders (Faller and zu Knyphausen-Aufseß 2018; Khan, Muttakin,
and Siddiqui 2013). Sartawi, Hindawi, and Bsoul (2014) contend that the presence of
foreign investors significantly influences the corporate information processing mechan-
ism and increases the level of voluntary disclosures. Coffie, Aboagye-Otchere, and Musah
(2018) argue that international operations of a firm diversify its ownership structure and
facilitates the formulation, implementation and reporting of ethical business principles.
However, some researchers also suggest that foreign ownership is negatively related to
corporate social responsibility performance, as these investors are concerned more in
financial performance and stock returns, while less in monitoring and corporate policies
(Liao, Lin, and Zhang 2018; Matuszak, Różańska, andMacuda 2019; McGuinness, Vieito,
and Wang 2017). Kolsi (2017) documents that the information demand is higher from
foreign investors owing to the geographical separation between management and
owners. Masud, Nurunnabi, and Bae (2018) document that foreign ownership has a posi-
tive impact on the extent of corporate social responsibility disclosures in Pakistan, India
and Bangladesh as firms use these disclosures as a proactive strategy to obtain continued
inflow of capital and to pacify ethical investors. The discussion leads to the following
hypothesis:
H8: Firms with more foreign ownership have a higher likelihood of issuing a sustainability
report.
3.2.3. Audit committee
The audit committee is a fundamental tool of corporate boards to implement efficient
decision control, information processing and oversight mechanism (Al-Shaer and
Zaman 2018). The size of an audit committee strengthens its capacity, knowledge base
and adds credibility to the corporate reporting practices (Alotaibi and Hussainey
2016). A larger audit committee has a diversity of expertise, experiences and views,
which improves the stakeholders’ confidence and sustainability performance (Buallay
and AlDhaen 2018). In addition, audit committee size has a positive impact on the
level of corporate social responsibility disclosures because a larger committee is more
likely to discover and resolve the issues and dilemmas in the reporting process (Appu-
hami and Tashakor 2017). Musallam (2018) argues that a larger audit committee is posi-
tively linked to corporate social behaviour and reporting as committee assignments are
spread across sufficient members with distinct opinions, backgrounds and interests.
Khan, Khan, and Saeed (2019) contend that an increase in audit committee size strength-
ens its capacity to facilitate the Pakistani firms in providing more information and
improves the quality of CSR disclosures. Buallay and Al-Ajmi (2019) find that larger
audit committees are more effective in monitoring and improving the extent of corporate
sustainability reporting practices. Considering these empirical arguments, the following
hypothesis is formulated:
H9: Firms with larger audit committees have a higher likelihood of issuing a sustainability
report.
The presence of independent directors on an audit committee strengthens its oversight
function and safeguards the interests of all stakeholders (Buallay and AlDhaen 2018).
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Independent audit committees are more effective in ensuring the credibility of corporate
reporting practices since these are free from management influence (Al-Shaer and
Zaman 2018). The independent committees are more likely to exercise their authority
over the management in requiring more informative disclosures and questioning man-
agers’ actions and policies when necessary (Buallay and Al-Ajmi 2019). However, Alo-
taibi and Hussainey (2016) contend that audit committee independence is negatively
associated with corporate social responsibility disclosures. Woidtke and Yeh (2013)
argue that audit committees are effective when they are entirely independent. On the
other hand, Herda, Taylor, andWinterbotham (2012) provide that independent directors
encourage a firm to issue a corporate sustainability report as their presence signals
accountability, transparency and commitment to sustainability. Independent members
of an audit committee improve the effectiveness of its monitoring mechanism and facili-
tate the integration of social responsibility into the corporate reporting process, which
strengthens the related disclosure practices (Appuhami and Tashakor 2017). Khan,
Khan, and Saeed (2019) advocate that audit committee independence has a positive
impact on the quality of CSR disclosures in Pakistan. Given this theoretical and empirical
debate, the following hypothesis is developed:
H10: Firms with more independent audit committees have a higher likelihood of issuing a
sustainability report.
4. Research design
The population of this study consists of the firms listed on the Pakistan Stock Exchange
(PSX). The financial firms are excluded due to their unique accounting practices (Alo-
taibi and Hussainey 2016). The availability of data has restricted our time horizon to
10 years from 2009 to 2018 and a final sample of 1380 firm-year observations, comprising
138 non-financial firms, Table 1 presents the sample distribution across industries.
Adopting within the overall framework of quantitative research strategy, a secondary
method of data collection is used in this study. Corporate governance data are manually
collected from the annual reports available on the websites of the selected firms, while
financial data are extracted from the OSIRIS database.
After collecting the necessary data, univariate analysis is performed based on descriptive
statistics and comparison tests. A parametric t-test and non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-





n % n % n %
Oil and Gas (IND_OIL) 3 13% 9 8% 12 9%
Technology and Communication (IND_TECH) 3 13% 11 10% 14 10%
Power and Utilities (IND_POW) 2 9% 6 5% 8 6%
Chemical and Fertiliser (IND_CHEM) 7 30% 12 10% 19 14%
Construction and Property (IND_CONS) 1 4% 10 9% 11 8%
Food and Personal Care (IND_CARE) 1 4% 16 14% 17 12%
Textile and Household (IND_TEX) 0 0% 25 22% 25 18%
Pharma and Packaging (IND_PHAR) 4 17% 14 12% 18 13%
Travel and Auto (IND_AUTO) 2 9% 12 10% 14 10%
23 100% 115 100% 138 100%
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sum (Mann–Whitney) test are conducted to statistically compare the equality of means for
continuous variables, while the test of equality of proportions is used in the case of binary
variables. The significance of this research is tested using the logistic regression model. The
underlying assumptions in the regression model are tested for multicollinearity based on
the correlation matrix, Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and Tolerance. Logistic regression
is employed in this study due to the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable – the
firm has either issued a voluntary sustainability report or not otherwise. This form of
regression is more robust by design as it overcomes the restrictive assumptions of linearity,
normality and equal variances. Logistic regression can predict the best possible value for
each coefficient in the model. Finally, the logistic regression is validated by Hosmer-Leme-
show Test and Likelihood Ratio Chi-square (LR Chi2) (Girella, Rossi, and Zambon 2019;
Gujarati and Porter 2009; Meurer and Tolles 2017).
The following logistic regression equation is proposed to test the hypotheses:
SRD it =b 0+ b 1 BSIZE it + b 2 BIND it + b 3 BDIV it
+ b 4 BMEET it + b 5 COWN it + b 6 IOWN it + b 7 MOWN it
+ b 8 FOWN it + b 9 AUDSIZ it + b 10 AUDIND it + b 11 BIG4 it
+ b 12 SIZE it + b 13 ROA it + b 14 LQ it + b 15 FCF it
+ b 16 LEV it + b 17 MTB it + b 18 DIV it + b 19 AGE it
+ b 20 EMP it + b 21 SUB it + b 22j IND it + 1 it (1)
All variables and their measures are described in Table 2. i is the individual firm, t
represents the time period, β is the estimated parameter, j represents the firms’ indus-
try ( j = 1,2,3,4), while ε is the error term. The study controls for firm-specific charac-
teristics that have been identified in empirical literature as determinants of corporate
sustainability reporting decision (Artiach et al. 2010; Kim et al. 2018; Muttakin and
Khan 2014). The study also control for the industry effect using industry control
variables (Appuhami and Tashakor 2017; Herda, Taylor, and Winterbotham 2012;
Lourenço and Branco 2013).
5. Results and discussion
5.1. Univariate analysis
Table 3 provides the univariate analysis represented by descriptive statistics and compari-
son tests for all the variables from 2009 to 2018. The sample firms are divided into two
groups on the basis of whether a corporate sustainability report has been issued by the
respective firm or not. It generates a subsample of 23 leading firms, which have volunta-
rily issued corporate sustainability reports and a subsample of 115 conventional firms.
The descriptive statistics exhibit the mean, standard deviation, minimum and
maximum values, while comparison tests identify the differences in mean values
between the leading and conventional firms for corporate governance and control vari-
ables. For continuous variables, the parametric t-tests identify significant differences in
mean values and the non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann–Whitney) tests high-
light the significant differences in mean rank values, while a test of proportions
focuses on the significant differences in mean values for binary variables.
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Table 2. Definition of variables.
Variable Definition
Pred




A dummy variable, takes 1 if the firm
issues a sustainability report,
otherwise 0.
Herda, Taylor, and Winterbotham
(2012), Hu and Loh (2018)
Independent Variables
BSIZE Board Size + Total number of directors on the
board.
Coffie, Aboagye-Otchere, and Musah
(2018), Girella, Rossi, and Zambon
(2019)
BIND Board Independence + Proportion of independent directors
to total board members.
Khan, Muttakin, and Siddiqui (2013),
Ong and Djajadikerta (2018)
BGD Board Gender Diversity + Proportion of female directors to
total board members.
Abad et al. (2017), Sarhan and Ntim
(2019)
BMEET Board Meetings + Number of board meetings held
during the financial year.
Alnabsha et al. (2018), Hu and Loh
(2018)
COWN Ownership Concentration − Percentage of total shares
outstanding belonging to block
holders having 5% or more shares.
Lourenço and Branco (2013), Kiliç,
Kuzey, and Uyar (2015)
IOWN Institutional Ownership + Percentage of total shares held by
institutional investors.
Boone and White (2015), Soliman, El
Din, and Sakr (2013)
MOWN Managerial Ownership − Percentage of total shares belonging
to the board of directors.
Faller and zu Knyphausen-Aufseß
(2018), Oh, Cha, and Chang (2017)
FOWN Foreign Ownership + Percentage of total shares
outstanding held by foreign
investors.
Faller and zu Knyphausen-Aufseß
(2018), Kolsi (2017)
AUDS Audit Committee Size + Total number of members serving on
the audit committee.
Alotaibi and Hussainey (2016),
Appuhami and Tashakor (2017)
AUDI Audit Committee
Independence
+ The fraction of independent audit
committee members to audit
committee size.
Herda, Taylor, and Winterbotham
(2012), Buallay and Al-Ajmi (2019)
Control Variables
BIG4 Big Four Auditors + A dummy variable, takes 1 if the
auditor is from big 4, otherwise 0.
Sarhan and Ntim (2019), Alnabsha
et al. (2018)
SIZE Firm Size + Natural logarithm of the operating
revenues of a firm.
Herda, Taylor, and Winterbotham
(2012), Liao, Lin, and Zhang (2018),
Oh, Cha, and Chang (2017)
ROA Firm Performance + Ratio of income before tax to total
assets.
Muttakin and Khan (2014), Masud,
Nurunnabi, and Bae (2018)
LQ Firm Liquidity +/− Ratio of the current assets to current
liabilities.
Alotaibi and Hussainey (2016), Herda,
Taylor, and Winterbotham (2012)
FCF Financial Capacity +/− Free cash flow of a firm divided by its
net sales
Artiach et al. (2010), Okpa et al.
(2019)
LEV Firm Leverage − Ratio of a firm’s total debt to its total
assets.
Herda, Taylor, and Winterbotham
(2012), Khan, Muttakin, and
Siddiqui (2013)
MTB Growth Opportunities +/− Market value of a firm’s equity
divided by its book value.
Girella, Rossi, and Zambon (2019),
Masud, Nurunnabi, and Bae (2018)
DIV Dividends +/− A dummy variable, takes 1 if the firm
paid any dividends, otherwise 0.
Alotaibi and Hussainey (2016),
Naseem et al. (2017)
AGE Firm Age +/− Natural logarithm of the number of
years a firm operates in the market.
Khan, Muttakin, and Siddiqui (2013),
Musallam (2018), Sarhan and Ntim
(2019)
EMP Number of Employees +/− Natural logarithm of a firm’s total
number of employees.
Kim et al. (2018)
SUB Number of Subsidiaries +/− A firm’s total number of subsidiaries. Kim et al. (2018)
IND Industry +/− See Table 1. Appuhami and Tashakor (2017),
Herda, Taylor, and Winterbotham
(2012), Lourenço and Branco
(2013)
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics and comparison tests.
Leading Firms Conventional Firms Comparison Tests
Variable N Mean S.D. Min Max N Mean S.D. Min Max t-stat z-value
Panel A: Continuous Variables
BSIZE 230 9.09 2.11 6.00 14.00 1150 8.06 1.60 5.00 17.00 8.47*** 8.10***
BIND 230 0.19 0.13 0.00 0.60 1150 0.15 0.12 0.00 0.71 4.07*** 3.13***
BGD 230 0.05 0.08 0.00 0.33 1150 0.08 0.13 0.00 0.71 −3.56*** −2.49**
BMEET 230 5.90 2.69 3.00 19.00 1150 5.40 2.04 2.00 19.00 3.17*** 2.95***
COWN 230 0.67 0.22 0.14 0.99 1150 0.64 0.18 0.00 0.96 2.46** 3.38***
IOWN 230 0.65 0.26 0.04 0.98 1150 0.39 0.31 0.00 0.98 11.97*** 11.60***
MOWN 230 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.12 1150 0.12 0.20 0.00 0.87 −8.17*** −10.66***
FOWN 230 0.30 0.32 0.00 0.98 1150 0.17 0.27 0.00 0.95 6.23*** 7.29***
AUDS 230 3.98 1.14 3.00 8.00 1150 3.43 0.70 2.00 7.00 9.64*** 7.80***
AUDI 230 0.30 0.20 0.00 1.00 1150 0.29 0.23 0.00 1.00 0.75 0.46
SIZE 230 17.39 1.39 13.61 20.05 1150 15.63 1.91 7.50 20.90 13.28*** 13.60***
ROA 230 0.10 0.10 −0.12 0.47 1150 0.08 0.14 −0.60 1.00 2.35** 2.68***
LIQ 230 0.98 0.76 0.17 5.41 1150 1.03 1.14 0.01 8.98 −0.58 2.11**
FCF 230 0.08 0.13 −0.31 0.50 1150 0.06 0.19 −0.73 0.68 0.95 0.88
LEV 230 0.20 0.20 0.00 0.74 1150 0.27 0.24 0.00 1.70 −4.47*** −4.62***
MTB 230 4.00 7.88 0.16 56.27 1150 1.92 3.19 0.04 41.71 6.64*** 6.24***
AGE 230 3.70 0.51 1.79 4.65 1150 3.44 0.60 0.69 5.06 6.15*** 6.58***
EMP 230 7.27 0.97 5.25 9.42 1150 6.53 1.43 2.89 10.15 7.57*** 7.70***
SUB 230 4.78 6.26 0.00 21.00 1150 5.62 12.34 0.00 89.00 −1.00 1.52
Panel B: Binary Variables
BIG4 230 0.91 0.28 0.00 1.00 1150 0.59 0.49 0.00 1.00 9.35***
DIV 230 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00 1150 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 2.43**

























The univariate tests indicate that leading firms have larger boards with a mean board
size of 9.09 as compared to 8.06 for conventional firms. It is substantiated by comparison
tests (t-stat 8.47, z-value 8.10) at the 1% level of significance, thereby providing initial
support for hypothesis H1. Similarly, the differences in BIND and BMEET are also stat-
istically significant in support of hypotheses H2 and H4, which suggests that corporate
boards of leading firms are more independent and more active than conventional
firms. However, univariate analysis reveals that leading firms have lesser women rep-
resentation and have higher block holdings as compared to conventional firms. In
addition, the differences in other ownership attributes are also significant, indicating
that the leading firms have greater institutional ownership, lower managerial ownership
and a higher level of foreign ownership than the conventional firms. The differences in
audit committee factors show that the firms issuing corporate sustainability reports have
larger audit committees than the firms not producing these reports. These results provide
initial statistical support for the study hypotheses. Moreover, these firms are more likely
to be audited by big four auditors, have significantly larger size, higher profitability, lower
liquidity and a lesser degree of debt in their capital structure. The leading firms also have
more growth opportunities, a higher number of employees, a higher likelihood of paying
dividends and are more aged as compared to the conventional firms.
5.2. Bivariate analysis
Table 4 reports the parametric Pearson correlation coefficients and the non-parametric
Spearman rank correlations between the sample variables including the dependent, inde-
pendent and control variables. The correlation matrix indicates that the degree of corre-
lation between the variables is either low or moderate, which signals that collinearity is
not likely to be a problem in this study. There is no pairwise correlation coefficient
greater than 80% between the independent variables, suggesting that the potential risk
of multicollinearity is limited (Gujarati and Porter 2009). Moreover, the results indicate
that the VIF statistics for all variables are between 1.128 and 5.587, and none of the vari-
ables have a VIF value of more than 10 or a tolerance value of less than 0.10. The highest
Pearson correlation (0.735) is observed between BIND and AUDI, which implies that
firms with independent boards also have more independent audit committees. The
highest Spearman’s coefficient of −0.752 between IOWN and MOWN signifies that
the presence of institutional investors discourages managerial ownership. The correlation
matrix is also used to measure the strength and direction of the linear relationship
between two variables. Both the Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients suggest
that sustainability reporting decision is significantly associated with most of the indepen-
dent and control variables in support of the hypotheses H1, H2, H4, H6, H7, H8 and H9.
5.3. Multivariate analysis
Table 5 reports the logistic regression results by estimating Equation (1) to explore the
determinants of corporate sustainability reporting decision from the context of listed
firms in Pakistan. The coefficient of BSIZE is −0.008 and is not statistically significant
at any level of significance. This result illustrates that board size has no impact on sus-
tainability reporting in Pakistan. A possible explanation is the cultural and political
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Table 4. Pearson/Spearman correlation matrix.
SRD BSIZE BIND BGD BMEET COWN IOWN MOWN FOWN AUDS AUDI
SRD 0.218*** 0.084*** −0.067** 0.079*** 0.091*** 0.312*** −0.287*** 0.196*** 0.210*** 0.012
BSIZE 0.222*** −0.041 −0.063** 0.158*** −0.055** 0.201*** −0.222*** 0.037 0.405*** 0.055**
BIND 0.109*** 0.107*** −0.092*** 0.109*** 0.044 0.169*** −0.247*** 0.120*** 0.107*** 0.769***
BGD −0.095*** −0.099*** −0.138*** −0.056** −0.058** −0.291*** 0.261*** −0.182*** −0.119*** −0.073***
BMEET 0.085*** 0.197*** 0.138*** −0.089*** −0.095*** 0.016 −0.055** −0.098*** 0.116*** 0.089***
COWN 0.066** −0.072*** 0.050* −0.061** −0.078*** 0.426*** −0.213*** 0.308*** −0.051* 0.120***
IOWN 0.307*** 0.198*** 0.190*** −0.286*** 0.024 0.449*** −0.752*** 0.549*** 0.243*** 0.173***
MOWN −0.215*** −0.148*** −0.175*** 0.205*** 0.006 0.152*** −0.648*** −0.456*** −0.242*** −0.202***
FOWN 0.166*** −0.033 0.046* −0.140*** −0.168*** 0.381*** 0.562*** −0.320*** 0.141*** 0.094***
AUDS 0.251*** 0.479*** 0.148*** −0.130*** 0.188*** −0.071*** 0.230*** −0.221*** 0.043 −0.092***
AUDI 0.02 0.084*** 0.735*** −0.106*** 0.099*** 0.122*** 0.176*** −0.139*** 0.064** 0.004
BIG4 0.252*** 0.265*** 0.116*** −0.166*** 0.071*** 0.048* 0.407*** −0.313*** 0.356*** 0.312*** 0.069**
SIZE 0.337*** 0.314*** 0.178*** −0.263*** 0.209*** 0.076*** 0.400*** −0.250*** 0.196*** 0.317*** 0.086***
ROA 0.063** 0.121*** 0.084*** −0.083*** 0.003 0.069** 0.204*** −0.135*** 0.223*** 0.154*** 0.021
LIQ −0.016 0.066** 0.147*** −0.026 0.108*** −0.004 0.128*** −0.139*** 0.074*** 0.129*** 0.108***
FCF 0.025 0.186*** 0.065** 0.001 0.028 0.025 0.158*** −0.112*** 0.066** 0.203*** 0.005
LEV −0.120*** −0.125*** −0.096*** 0.052* 0.028 −0.110*** −0.326*** 0.222*** −0.355*** −0.185*** −0.061**
MTB 0.176*** 0.096*** 0.055** −0.041 −0.046* 0.208*** 0.227*** −0.122*** 0.316*** 0.101*** 0.050*
DIV 0.065** 0.104*** 0.104*** −0.137*** 0.068** −0.072*** 0.157*** −0.166*** 0.141*** 0.141*** 0.067**
AGE 0.163*** 0.137*** 0.154*** −0.122*** 0.032 0.023 0.111*** −0.088*** 0.150*** 0.082*** 0.092***
EMP 0.200*** 0.201*** 0.103*** −0.111*** 0.203*** −0.021 0.134*** −0.100*** 0.070*** 0.238*** 0.043
SUB −0.027 0.047* −0.029 −0.105*** 0.116*** −0.157*** 0.004 −0.062** −0.027 0.075*** −0.052*
BIG4 SIZE ROA LIQ FCF LEV MTB DIV AGE EMP SUB
SRD 0.252*** 0.366*** 0.072*** 0.057** 0.024 −0.124*** 0.168*** 0.065** 0.177*** 0.207*** 0.041
BSIZE 0.262*** 0.287*** 0.130*** 0.141*** 0.175*** −0.111*** 0.222*** 0.109*** 0.173*** 0.224*** 0.155***
BIND 0.101*** 0.170*** 0.073*** 0.089*** 0.035 −0.062** 0.176*** 0.095*** 0.139*** 0.029 0.077***
BGD −0.125*** −0.238*** −0.026 −0.037 0.042 0.063** −0.036 −0.090*** −0.083*** −0.081*** −0.075***
BMEET 0.102*** 0.191*** 0.024 0.061** 0.034 0.028 0.042 0.065** 0.009 0.109*** 0.247***
COWN 0.049* 0.079*** 0.041 −0.029 0.002 −0.184*** 0.212*** −0.068** 0.044 −0.006 −0.330***
IOWN 0.418*** 0.435*** 0.200*** 0.237*** 0.139*** −0.357*** 0.295*** 0.173*** 0.169*** 0.141*** −0.035
MOWN −0.377*** −0.393*** −0.118*** −0.189*** −0.127*** 0.312*** −0.255*** −0.138*** −0.134*** −0.081*** 0.022



























BIG4 SIZE ROA LIQ FCF LEV MTB DIV AGE EMP SUB
AUDS 0.319*** 0.295*** 0.145*** 0.186*** 0.201*** −0.175*** 0.234*** 0.131*** 0.086*** 0.207*** 0.159***
AUDI 0.051* 0.066** 0.022 0.079*** −0.003 −0.073*** 0.105*** 0.063** 0.132*** −0.024 0.003
BIG4 0.377*** 0.316*** 0.262*** 0.240*** −0.318*** 0.352*** 0.244*** 0.041 0.066** 0.197***
SIZE 0.411*** 0.337*** 0.171*** 0.203*** −0.206*** 0.299*** 0.380*** 0.170*** 0.593*** 0.285***
ROA 0.304*** 0.352*** 0.487*** 0.441*** −0.504*** 0.537*** 0.518*** 0.111*** 0.169*** 0.118***
LIQ 0.179*** 0.031 0.307*** 0.215*** −0.572*** 0.267*** 0.305*** 0.066** 0.021 0.153***
FCF 0.240*** 0.335*** 0.389*** 0.116*** −0.249*** 0.268*** 0.241*** 0.006 0.186*** 0.071***
LEV −0.332*** −0.287*** −0.461*** −0.402*** −0.246*** −0.366*** −0.237*** −0.182*** −0.018 −0.015
MTB 0.175*** 0.167*** 0.351*** −0.018 0.158*** −0.134*** 0.290*** 0.138*** 0.026 −0.025
DIV 0.244*** 0.387*** 0.457*** 0.164*** 0.242*** −0.256*** 0.115*** 0.141*** 0.235*** 0.126***
AGE 0.04 0.158*** 0.091*** 0.021 0.033 −0.206*** 0.106*** 0.141*** 0.306*** 0.200***
EMP 0.065** 0.615*** 0.166*** −0.014 0.242*** −0.075*** 0.084*** 0.238*** 0.315*** 0.291***
SUB 0.033 0.133*** 0.095*** 0.079*** 0.031 −0.065** −0.032 0.125*** 0.095*** 0.157***
Note: Lower-triangular cells report Pearson’s correlation coefficients, upper-triangular cells are Spearman’s rank correlation.










environment of developing countries, where board vacancies are filled by personal con-
nections instead of professional competence, which renders these boards ineffective
(Khan, Khan, and Saeed 2019; Sarhan and Ntim 2019; Sartawi, Hindawi, and Bsoul
2014). The regression results demonstrate that the association between SRD and BIND
is not significant. It provides that the level of board independence is irrelevant to sustain-
ability reporting (Appuhami and Tashakor 2017; Girella, Rossi, and Zambon 2019). The
result is also in line with Majeed, Aziz, and Saleem (2015) in Pakistan’s context
suggesting that independent directors lack focused knowledge about CSR issues. There-
fore, H2 is rejected.
BGD is positively associated with SRD at the 10% level of significance implying that
firms with more female directors on their boards are more likely to publish standalone
sustainability reports. It supports H3 and stakeholder perspective that gender-diverse
boards are more concerned about corporate social responsibility and seek more volun-
tary information, which improves the decision-making process and the disclosure prac-
tices (Frias-Aceituno, Rodriguez-Ariza, and Garcia-Sanchez 2013; Lone, Ali, and Khan
2016; Rao and Tilt 2016). In addition, the regression coefficient of SRD on BMEET is
−0.018 and is statistically insignificant at any level of significance. It indicates that the
sustainability reporting decision of a firm is not related to the frequency of its board
meetings. Board meetings are not necessarily useful since routine tasks absorb much
of the meetings’ time (Alotaibi and Hussainey 2016; Al-Shaer and Zaman 2018; Khan,
Table 5. Logistic regression results.
Variables Coefficient Std. Error Wald Chi2 Significance Odds Ratio VIF Tolerance
Intercept −22.935 2.124 116.640 0.000***
BSIZE −0.008 0.066 0.014 0.905 0.992 1.580 0.633
BIND −1.231 1.199 1.061 0.305 0.292 3.128 0.320
BGD 1.677 0.907 3.423 0.064* 1.861 1.213 0.825
BMEET −0.018 0.056 0.109 0.740 0.982 1.209 0.827
COWN −2.341 1.095 4.580 0.032** 0.096 2.767 0.361
IOWN 3.300 0.981 11.290 0.001*** 27.103 5.587 0.179
MOWN −5.385 2.742 3.842 0.050** 0.005 3.406 0.294
FOWN −1.501 0.464 10.498 0.001*** 0.223 2.098 0.477
AUDSIZ 0.395 0.131 9.120 0.002*** 1.485 1.573 0.636
AUDIND −1.742 0.678 6.605 0.01** 0.175 2.874 0.348
BIG4 0.380 0.345 1.210 0.271 1.462 1.836 0.545
SIZE 1.009 0.126 64.481 0.000*** 2.743 4.058 0.246
ROA −1.864 1.184 2.465 0.115 0.155 2.052 0.487
LIQ 0.020 0.143 0.020 0.891 1.020 1.441 0.694
FCF −3.565 0.801 19.803 0.000*** 0.028 1.354 0.739
LEV −1.121 0.692 2.624 0.105 0.326 1.866 0.536
MTB 0.055 0.021 6.605 0.010** 1.057 1.393 0.718
DIV −0.303 0.226 1.796 0.181 0.739 1.455 0.687
AGE 1.059 0.219 23.426 0.000*** 2.884 1.370 0.730
EMP −0.038 0.128 0.090 0.766 0.963 3.061 0.327
SUB −0.041 0.014 8.468 0.004*** 0.959 1.128 0.886
IND_OIL −0.669 0.519 1.664 0.198 0.512 2.278 0.439
IND_TECH 2.929 0.439 44.489 0.000*** 18.707 1.525 0.656
IND_POW −1.536 0.670 5.244 0.022** 0.215 2.134 0.469
IND_CHEM 2.854 0.430 43.957 0.000*** 17.359 1.867 0.536
IND_CONS 1.112 0.509 4.796 0.029** 3.042 1.519 0.658
IND_CARE 0.251 0.550 0.212 0.649 1.285 1.633 0.612
IND_PHAR 2.637 0.407 41.861 0.000*** 13.965 1.493 0.670
LR Chi2 533.13***
Hosmer-Lemeshow Test 7.710
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
JOURNAL OF SUSTAINABLE FINANCE & INVESTMENT 17
Khan, and Saeed 2019). This result is inconsistent with H4 that firms with more frequent
board meetings have a higher likelihood of issuing a sustainability report.
The results indicate that the regression coefficient for COWN is negative and statisti-
cally significant (coefficient −2.341, p < 0.05), which validates the hypothesis H5 that the
firm with lower concentrated ownership has a higher likelihood of issuing a sustainabil-
ity report. These findings are consistent with the stakeholder premise suggesting that
the issue of social responsibility and accountability becomes less important if the own-
ership is concentrated because the demand for public disclosure is relatively weak
(Coffie, Aboagye-Otchere, and Musah 2018; Kolsi 2017; Sartawi, Hindawi, and Bsoul
2014). The results are also along the lines of Mahmood, Kouser, and Masud (2019)
in Pakistan’s context. We also find that MOWN is negatively related to SRD (coefficient
−5.385, p < 0.05), which justifies H7 and indicates that leading corporate sustainability
firms in Pakistan have lower managerial ownership. The results of the parametric t-test
and non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann–Whitney) test (Table 3) also provide
statistical support to this outcome. Stakeholder theory advocates that an increase in
managerial ownership makes the managers more powerful than other stakeholders,
triggers self-seeking behaviour and reluctance to engage in social initiatives (Khan,
Muttakin, and Siddiqui 2013; Masud, Nurunnabi, and Bae 2018; Oh, Cha, and
Chang 2017).
This paper contributes to the ongoing debate about the impact of institutional own-
ership on voluntary sustainability reporting from the context of Pakistani firms. Table 5
reveals that the coefficient for IOWN is positive and significant (coefficient 3.30, p <
0.01), contributing strong support for hypothesis H6. The findings are also consistent
with the results of Comparison Tests reported in Table 3. Stakeholder theory suggests
that the presence of institutional investors encourages the firm to report more voluntary
information because these disclosures strengthen the corporate image, long-term repu-
tation and mitigate the pressure from stakeholders (Harjoto and Jo 2011; Soliman, El
Din, and Sakr 2013). The results are also consistent with Masud, Nurunnabi, and Bae
(2018) in the context of South Asian countries involving Pakistan, India and Bangladesh.
The study finds that FOWN is negatively linked to SRD indicating that firms with a
higher proportion of foreign ownership are less likely to publish corporate sustainability
reports (coefficient −1.501, p < 0.01). These findings are not coherent with the expec-
tations of H8, and suggest that foreign investors in Pakistani firms do not protect the
interests of all stakeholders. The extant literature provides that foreign ownership in
Chinese firms is negatively related to corporate social responsibility performance, as
these investors are concerned more in financial performance and stock returns, while
less in corporate monitoring and sustainability (Liao, Lin, and Zhang 2018; McGuinness,
Vieito, and Wang 2017). Likewise, Matuszak, Różańska, and Macuda (2019) register that
foreign investors have less moral attachment and for that reason negatively influence the
level of CSR disclosures in Polish firms.
Logistic regression results indicate that AUDS is positively associated with SRD
(coefficient 0.395, p < 0.01) implying that firms with large audit committees are
more likely to issue standalone sustainability reports. The results of the descriptive
statistics and comparison tests (Table 3) also provide statistical support to this
outcome. It substantiates H9 and stakeholder perspective that larger audit committees
have a diverse knowledge base, experiences and views, which improves the
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stakeholders’ confidence and sustainability performance (Appuhami and Tashakor
2017; Buallay and AlDhaen 2018; Khan, Khan, and Saeed 2019). The study reveals
that the regression coefficient for AUDI is negative and significant (coefficient
−1.742, p < 0.05), which advocates that the firms with more independent audit com-
mittees have a lower likelihood of publishing a sustainability report. It is an unex-
pected outcome, not consistent with the prediction of hypothesis H10. Evidence
suggests that audit committee independence is negatively associated with corporate
social responsibility disclosures (Alotaibi and Hussainey 2016; Hermawan and
Gunardi 2019). In addition, Fodio, Ibikunle, and Oba (2013) using the Nigerian
data and Woidtke and Yeh (2013) using the East Asian data contend that audit com-
mittees are effective when these are entirely independent, while Table 3 shows that the
average independence of audit committees is 30% and 29% respectively for the leading
and conventional firms in Pakistan.
Moreover, the logistic regression reveals that firm size (SIZE), growth opportunities
(MTB) and firm age (AGE) have a positive impact on the voluntary sustainability reporting
decision, which are consistent with the prior studies (Artiach et al. 2010; Dienes, Sassen,
and Fischer 2016; Herda, Taylor, and Winterbotham 2012; Muttakin and Khan 2014;
Oh, Cha, and Chang 2017). The results also indicate that the firm financial capacity
(FCF) and the number of its subsidiaries (SUB) are related negatively to SRD. Previous
research on sustainability reporting provides empirical support to these findings (Artiach
et al. 2010; Haniffa and Cooke 2002). Table 5 also indicates that firms operating in technol-
ogy (IND_TECH), chemical (IND_CHEM) and pharma (IND_PHAR) industries are more
likely to issue a sustainability report, as their regression coefficients are positive and signifi-
cant at 1% level. These industry effects are also in line with the results of earlier studies (Ali,
Frynas, and Mahmood 2017; Coffie, Aboagye-Otchere, and Musah 2018; Herda, Taylor,
and Winterbotham 2012; Muttakin and Khan 2014). The overall findings of the study
provide empirical evidence, which suggests that corporate governance attributes, firm
characteristics and industry sectors are important determinants of sustainability reporting
decision in Pakistan. These results are consistent with the stakeholder perspective.
To assess the validity of the logistic regression model and the accuracy of its predicted
outcomes, a number of tests are performed. The Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test
measures the differences between the predicted and observed outcomes (Meurer and
Tolles 2017). When there is a good agreement, it will not show a statistically significant
difference. The p-value of 0.462 (χ2 = 7.71) indicates that our model is well calibrated.
The likelihood ratio chi-square (LR Chi2) is an omnibus test to ensure the perfect suit-
ability of the logistic regression model to the study data (Girella, Rossi, and Zambon
2019). The results (χ2 = 533.13, p-value = 0.000) suggest that our model fits the data
well. Hence, it provides excellent goodness of fit for logistic regression to study the deter-
minants of corporate sustainability reporting. Moreover, VIF and Tolerance statistics for
all variables indicate that collinearity does not appear to create a threat to the interpret-
ation of the regression coefficients (Gujarati and Porter 2009).
6. Conclusions
Sustainability reporting is being used increasingly by businesses as a powerful mechan-
ism in corporate policy and strategy. It covers all areas of economic efficiency, social
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responsibility, environmental awareness, ethical culture and corporate governance. Cor-
porate sustainability reporting is gaining momentum around the globe as a voluntary
reporting mechanism to enhance stakeholders’ confidence. However, it is drawing atten-
tion in emerging economies. With 540 listed firms, Pakistan has a handful of reporting on
sustainability performance. There is a paucity of research on the organisational determi-
nants of corporate sustainability reporting. Using a stakeholder framework, this study
aims to empirically examine the determinants of sustainability reporting decision from
the perspective of an emerging economy, Pakistan.
Empirical findings support the stakeholder perspective and suggest that the firms with
more gender- diverse boards, larger audit committees and higher institutional ownership
are more likely to issue sustainability reports. The results provide that concentrated own-
ership, managerial ownership, foreign ownership and audit committee independence
negatively influence the firms’ sustainability reporting decision. Overall, the impact of
board composition on sustainability reporting decision is weak, it is strong for ownership
structure and mixed for audit committee factors. In terms of firm characteristics, size of
the firm, financial capacity, growth opportunities and firm age also influence the volun-
tary reporting decision. Moreover, firms operating in technology, chemical and pharma
industries are more likely to issue a sustainability report. These findings suggest that in a
disclosure environment with little or no regulation, governance attributes, firm charac-
teristics and industry sectors can predict whether firms issue standalone sustainability
reports.
The findings provide valuable insight to the policymakers by identifying the attributes
that require regulatory focus to achieve the public policy objective of sustainable devel-
opment. The study suggests that firms can enhance their sustainability reporting by
having gender-diverse boards. However, the results highlight that current corporate gov-
ernance guidelines for board composition play a limited role in providing specific rec-
ommendations to the stakeholders. It is an indication that further improvements in
the effectiveness of corporate boards are necessary to address the stakeholders’ pressure
through sustainability reporting. Table 3 reveals that the representation of independent
directors on boards is 19% and 15% respectively for the leading and conventional firms in
Pakistan. Therefore, SECP should ensure that the firms comply with its rule of having at
least one-third of the total members of the board as an independent. The firms should
also make appropriate arrangements to carry out orientation for all their directors to
acquaint them with corporate social responsibility and to improve the competitive
advantage through sustainability reporting.
The results advocate that ownership structure has an impact on the strategic decisions
of the firm by indicating that different shareholders differ in their attitude towards sus-
tainability engagement. Our findings present evidence that sustainability reporting can
be used as leverage for attracting institutional investors, to actively invest in firms
employing socially responsible practices. The regulators should also take appropriate
measures to make the foreign and managerial ownership effective in driving the corpor-
ate sustainability reporting agenda in Pakistan. Moreover, the findings are of interest to
policymakers for evaluating the role of the audit committee in improving the CSR dis-
closure practices. The empirical results suggest that audit committee size is a critical
factor influencing the sustainability reporting decision of Pakistani firms. The negative
association between audit committee independence and sustainability reporting decision
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induces rethinking among the regulators in Pakistan and calls for fully independent audit
committees.
In addition, the study suggests that large firms and older firms are more likely to issue
sustainability reports. Therefore, regulators should encourage small, medium and
younger firms to adopt sustainability practices. The empirical results also indicate that
the firms operating in technology, chemical and pharma industries are actively
engaged in sustainability reporting. It seems that the firms operating in other sectors
are not facing any pressure from the stakeholders to disclose sustainability information.
These findings provide useful insight to the corporate sector to meet the growing infor-
mation requirements of stakeholders, manage sustainability performance, and address
the social and environmental risks and opportunities.
The study acknowledges some limitations that suggest opportunities for future
research. The findings of this research may not be applicable to all emerging economies
since they have different investment climates, corporate structures, capital allocations,
and are therefore not a homogeneous group. Moreover, it would be worthwhile to
conduct a similar study in the financial sector to obtain new intuitions. The qualitative
research methods may also help to do an in-depth evaluation of the effectiveness of
corporate boards and audit committees in Pakistan. Despite these limitations, the
results of this study present valuable insight into firms’ voluntary sustainability report-
ing decision.
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